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This thesis looks at the equity and efficiency effects of Choice. Specifically
studied is equalization effects in school finance and the "collective add-on" as pro-
posed by John Chubb and Terry Moe in Politics, Markets, and America's Schools.
Analysed as a system, the educational sector is described as a process whereby
the polity reproduces itself. Hence, the control of the sector by state, parental and
social interests is considered as the system is set in motion under the Choice proposal.
Operating under the principles of best and equal, or inequality and equality, the
system expands until it reaches a point of diminishing marginal utility.
Because equity and efficiency are difficult to achieve synonomously, the ques-
tion is raised regarding whether we are underinvesting in our children and whether
a common commitment to democratic citizenship should lie at the heart of what
education should be about.
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I. PANACEA OR PERESTROIKA?
Among the school reform agendas suggested for the 1990s is Choice - a system
of vouchers - where parents and children could shop for schools. In its purest form,
as suggested in John Chubb and Terry Moe's book Politics, Markets and American
Schools , parents would be able to choose from both private and public schools. The
private schools would be allowed into the system of new schools "as long as their
sectarian functions can be kept clearly separate from their educational functions"
(Chubb and Moe, p. 219). Autonomy would be given to a school system at whatever
level the community decided - district, school board, or school. Parents and chil-
dren as consumers of education would drive the demand for education. Unwanted
dysfunctional schools - bad products - would be driven from the market place.
Through this systemic change, contend Chubb and Moe, our schools will im-
prove. "Broadly speaking, schools of choice tend to be more informal, professional,
and unified around a common mission. . . . Their teachers are more autonomous,
more excited about their work, more influential in decision-making, and happier
with their overall situations. Students are more satisfied with their chosen schools;
dropout and absenteeism rates are down; achievement scores are up. Parents are
better informed, more supportive and participate actively" (Chubb and Moe, p.
209).
Supporters of Choice say this is a perestroika for education (Bliss, pp. 154-
168). Opponents say Choice "is not a panacea" for the problems of the education
sector (Honig, pp. 15-16). The argument has drawn educators, economists, school
bureaucrats, and all manner of educational do-gooders into the ring. Goal 2000 has
been promulgated by Lamar Alexander and President Bush, and Choice is on the
agenda. (Shapiro, pp. 59-60)
This thesis will look at the equity and efficiency effects of the Choice finance
plan as proposed in Politics, Markets, and America's Schools. What is good about
the Choice proposal - Can equity be achieved? Is it more efficient? What are some
of the negative impacts? Will Choice lead us back to segregation? Are there welfare
losses? - and what can be done - if anything - to guard against the negative impacts.
A micro economic approach has been taken to attempt to answer this question, but
because the issue is one which is as much social and political as it is economic, the
framework of the thesis is not limited to an economic analysis.
A. WHY A MICRO ECONOMIC APPROACH?
Douglas Windham, in an article for the International Institute for Education
Planning's Seminar on Educational Planning and Social Change states,
One must study the complexity of education as it exists, while simultane-
ously developing a theoretical model of educational processes based upon the
response of individuals to perceived incentives and information. This model
should be designed to show how decision-making in education can be con-
ducted in a manner that is both more rational in its conception and more
realistic in its expectations.
(Weiler, pp. 107-121)
His thesis is based, in part, on the precept that
centrist planners . . . never determine the actual outcomes of policy. They can
only set in action forces which they anticipate . . . The effects are the result
of the millions of micro decisions made by individuals who are responding to
the planner's policies in terms of 1) the actual pattern of rewards (positive or
negative) which their decision matrix represents and 2) the perception of this
pattern.
(Weiler, pp. 107-121)
From this thesis, other questions will arise: Is Choice a system that improves the
concurrence of both public and private preferences? Will Choice - a system where
consumers can exert their preferences and the market can respond to consumer
demand - improve our nation's schools?
The bottom line is that Choice is neither panacea nor perestroika. There
are good aspects to Choice and bad - or negative - side effects. That does not
mean that Choice doesn't have its place in the varieties of reform. Choice, in fact,
may provide the conduit, a lever, for much needed and innovative change, especially
in releasing the schools from cumbersome forms of bureaucracy and regulation and
empowering teachers, administrators and parents.
Chapter II, the conceptual framework, will describe the educational sector,
for this will be the backdrop of the analysis of where Choice works and where it
doesn't. Chapter III will provide an examination of the current literature regarding
school finance issues. In Chapter IV, the education sector will be "set in motion"
and analyzed to show the equity and efficiency effects of the school finance proposal.
Conclusions, recommendations and further questions will be posed in Chapter V.
II. THE EDUCATIONAL SECTOR
Our national system of schooling, originally developed to support an industrial
economy, is not isolated from the host society that sponsors it.
The forms of the educational system, and the purposes to which it will be
put, are reflective of the host polity - its unique political, economic, social,
cultural, religious characteristics as well as historic antecedents. Presumably
the polity fosters an educational system to reap certain social outcomes.
(Weiler, p. 17)
These outcomes include increases in productivity and income and appropriate ca-
reer preparation, as well as correct social and political behavior, literacy and cultural
attainments. These social outcomes provide feedback to the polity and ensure con-
tinuance of the host polity values, mores, etc. The polity generates the outlines of the
educational process, providing resources in the form of budgets, facilities, personnel
and materials, and monitors the activities of the process in the form of curriculum
standards, compulsory age attendance, admission standards, student/teacher ratios,
school organization and bureaucracy. (Weiler, p. 17)
This framework is shown in Figure 2.1 and will be the framework against which
this thesis will analyze the effects of equalization and collective add-ons as proposed
by Chubb and Moe.
A. THE STAKEHOLDERS IN THE EDUCATIONAL SECTOR
The size of the system, its social control, the bureaucracy, regulations and
financial arrangements can be discovered in the "structure of the interests whose
presence makes the system arise in the first place" (Green, p. 19-29). These interests
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Figure 2.1: The Educational Sector and its Control (Adapted from Green
and Weiler)
described in Figure 2.1. These interests can be broken down into four groups: the
state, parents, society and incumbents.
First, there are the interests of the state (described as a "legal organization
of society" to differentiate from society as described below). Basically, these in-
terests consist of "two sorts, compelling and derived. The compelling interests can
be summed up in two requirements - that 1) each individual attain economic in-
dependence, and 2) that each grant minimum obedience to civil law." The derived
interests arise from the state's ability to secure its compelling interests. A state may
have no interest in what is best for each child, but "has an interest in ensuring that
children are not educated in ways that threaten the state's continued existence."
Hence, in the model of the educational sector (Figure 2.1), it can be seen that the
political and social inputs of the polity are designed to ensure the educational and
social outcomes of values, attitudes, political behavior and child rearing behavior,
or the ability to derive income through an occupation - the attributes the state
desires. These outcomes are expected to be equal for all children to a minimal
degree (e.g., minimum curriculum requirements). (Green, pp. 22-24, Weiler, pp.
15-20)
Second, there are the interests of the parents. These interests would begin by
being identical to the compelling interests of the state in substance. The difference is
that the state's interests are minimal in the requirement for equality of educational
opportunity for all. Parental interest, assuming it is rational, is maximal because
it
aspires to the best that is possible . . . seek[ing] not simply the best that is
possible on the whole, but the best that is possi Die for their own children.
(Green, p. 25)
Looking at the educational sector, we see that the interests of the parents include
those of the state. However, parents
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interests are more specific, especially regarding
values and educational outcomes to secure a certain type and level of occupation
and income (e.g., grades, skills and certification to acquire a desired profession).
Third, there are the interests of society. Again, these are the same as the
interests of the state, yet they extend beyond what is minimum. However, they are
not maximum to the extent of the parents interest because the interests of society
fall short of what is best for anyone in particular. They are
1. interests in those goods that benefit everyone even if their distribution is re-
stricted to a few, and
2. interests in those goods that cannot be possessed by anyone unless they are
secured for everyone.
Society has an interest in education as a good because education has positive
externalities. Not only is education essential for society, it is essential for a good
society.
Obviously, societal interests can be varied and enormous. However, they can
be reduced to three "equally specific, kindred, though different claims:" (Green, pp.
25-28)
1. Everyone benefits from the development of an educated elite whose skills
and judgement contribute to the good conduct of government and preser-
vation of an orderly society;
2. Everyone benefits from the expansion of skills and talents that contribute
to the continued advancement and development of society; and
3. Everyone benefits from the widest possible distribution of certain mini-
mal skills (reading, math, certain values like respect and certain attitudes
such as punctuality).
Finally, there are the interests of the incumbents. Incumbents may be parents,
members of society and agents of the state. Incumbents may include teachers and
administrators whose interests may be as employees (they are paid), as professionals
(they practice an art) and as technicians (they practice a craft or make something
happen). (Green, p. 29)
B. THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES
In Figure 2.1, educational outcomes are described as skills, knowledge, values,
attitudes, grades and certificates. These can be further disaggregated in that knowl-
edge, skills and values can be actual benefits derived from education while the grades,
certificates, diplomas, transcripts, and licenses can be viewed as second-order ben-
efits. These second-order benefits can be viewed as "exclusively instrumental" in
that they provide the practical link between educational benefits and social benefits,
specifically, the benefits of occupation and income. Second-order goods have a mea-
surable amount of utility. They measure or indicate a level of achievement as one
exits the educational sector (achievement being the level of mastery or knowledge
acquired versus attainment, which means the last level achieved). The level of
achievement provides a basis for entry into the labor force at a certain occupation
level.
How should second order goods be distributed? State, parental and societal
interests will guide distribution and are expressed in the terms of best and equal.
As described above, the state will seek to attain some minimum level of competence
for all, whereas rational parents will want the best. In the realm of best, there are
some distinctions to be made. As we have seen above, the interest of parents best
can be described as what is best is better than what everyone else receives. Ideally,
if we were to want the best in education for our own children, we would want the
education that the rich can afford or what the gifted receive. Another
distinction of best is that each person is entitled to receive the education that is
best for him or her. (Green, pp. 110-115)
The equal principle means that each individual is entitled to receive an edu-
cation at least as good as (equal to) that provided for others (Green, p. 114).
The interests of the society will be met by an equal distribution, except for
those who are determined to be the "educated elite." For them, society will want
to provide the best.
The educational system will distribute its benefits unequally and will do so no
matter how the system is organized. . . . The fact is that some people do well
in the system and some do not do so well. In order for the system to be just
and fair, it must distribute benefits based on educationally relevant attributes.
(Green, pp. 49-50)
These attributes are choice, courage and ability.
No inequality in the distribution of educational achievement can be regarded
as unjust if it results from the exercise of choice, courage or ability. . . . Race,
sex and social class are never the result of choice . . . are unrelated to the
possession of courage . . . and do not determine ability.
(Green, pp. 51-52)
C. SUMMARY
Control of the educational sector is accomplished by the interaction of state,
parental and societal interests. Parents will normally want what is best for their
child, whereas the state will tend to try to equalize outcomes for all children. The
society will attempt to achieve and sustain goodness by providing for those who do
well, who display courage, choice and ability.
Planning and reform in education have become measured and determined by
the political ordination of society - the vision of the society's future by those in
power. If the school system is the process for reproducing polity, and its functions
and outcomes correspond with the society as a whole, then it is apparent that the
process itself cannot reduce the inequalities of society. Our society does not judge
purely on the relevant attributes described as to who will receive more or better
educational resources. Schools cannot be expected to win The War on Poverty, to
defeat drugs, racism and sexism, when the school is but a microcosm of a society
with those factors imbued in its cultural fabric.
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III. SCHOOL FINANCE UNDER CHOICE: A
BALANCE BETWEEN EFFICIENCY AND
EQUITY?
The scheme for financing schools suggested in Politics, Markets, and America's
Schools is an equalization scheme "that requires wealthier districts to contribute
more per child than poor districts and that guarantees students in all districts an
adequate financial foundation." However, communities can vote for collective add-
ons if they want to "spend more per child than the state requires them to spend"
(Chubb and Moe, p. 220). Currently, school finance reform is being challenged in
approximately twenty states who operate "two separate but unequal public educa-
tion systems - those for the rich and those for the poor" (Kozol, p. 42).
The following chapter examines the effects of equalization and the collective
add-ons as proposed in John Chubb and Terry Moe's book. This examination
will be conducted against the conceptual framework of the educational sector, as
described in Chapter II. It will be seen that, because of the nature of the educational
sector - it lies deeply embedded in our social and democratic system - Choice is
not the quantum leap for education or education policy as some had hoped. It is,
however, a lever to incrementally change the system. If used wisely, it could induce
its movement upward to accommodate the increasing numbers of children at risk,
perhaps improving social mobility for a greater majority than presently is the case.
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A. THE ISSUE OF FINANCIAL EQUITY: AN EXAMINATION OF
CURRENT LITERATURE
A central inequity inherent in public schools is that a child's social class influ-
ences the quality of schooling he will receive. Many states attempted to improve the
equity within their school districts in the 1970s and 1980s by equalizing local tax
bases of school districts in order to promote more equal expenditures per pupil. Be-
cause of wide spending gaps between rich and poor communities and the challenges
of the school reform movement to
extend to all students the intellectual training usually reserved for the privi-
leged and gifted,
reform involving financial equity, termed equalization, was set in motion in several
states (Toch, p. 16).
The underlying premise for equalizing school expenditures is that equality
of educational opportunity is more achievable when the definition seeks to attain
equality among schools rather than pupils.
An educational system is equitable when a level of educational achievement is
attained by a child independent of the school he attends.
(McCarty, p. 253)
However, in a 1990 study titled On Equalizing School Expenditures , a detailed in-
vestigation of a small number of these reform states found that
. . . the school finance reform movement promoted greater tax equity and some-
what diminished the strong relationship between district wealth and spending,
but accomplished very little in terms of equalizing the vast disparities in per-
pupil expenditures that existed prior to reform . . . reform in school finance to
achieve equity has been 'much ado about nothing'.
(Geske, pp. 55-57)
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Why is this? The problem can be seen in the attempts to deal with the equalization
plans as proposed in California during the 1970s.
In 1971, as a result of a school-finance ruling, California equalized expendi-
tures across school districts. However, some districts get around the social costs of
equalization through the use of parcel taxes.
Parents who live in districts with parcel taxes say they are just trying to get
kids out from under the lowest-common-denominator funding allocated by the
financially strapped state government.
(Walsh, pp. A1-A16)
This is allowable, in fact encouraged, under a Choice system.
Complete equalization . . . strikes us as too stifling . . . The citizens of each
district can be given the freedom to decide whether they want to spend more
per child than the state requires them to spend. They can determine how im-
portant education is to them and how much they are willing to tax themselves
for it.
(Chubb and Moe, p. 220)
According to Kozol, the parcel tax is the main reason that there are enormous
disparities between inner-city and suburban schools.
This is exacerbated by the fact that there may be unequal demand for educa-
tion from school district to school district. Since the demand for education varies
widely between districts, any imposed uniform level or expenditures will involve wel-
fare losses, especially for the richer communities. What influences a consumer's
ability to receive a desired amount of education is the consumer's ability to locate
to a certain school district. The more income people have, the more mobility they
have. Income can free them to relocate to a district that can provide the type and
amount of education they desire. If they are forced to consume less (which may be
equal to what everyone else has), and are still paying a higher tax rate, they are
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experiencing a welfare loss. Conversely, the poor district, able to consume more
than they previously could, will also experience the effects of the income transfer,
which may be a welfare loss or gain.
To exert influence on local demand for education, the most effective state pol-
icy that could be adopted is a progressive income tax. (In order to redistribute
income and wealth, a higher income tax rate is imposed on the wealthy. A progres-
sive tax can also be seen as a means to reduce the private spending power of the
wealthy: by paying higher taxes, their spending ability is reduced. (Bronfenbrenner,
p. 397; Kozol, p. 42, McCarty, p. 260)) By raising or lowering a district's tax rate,
states may induce districts to spend more or less than they otherwise would. The
bottom line is, if a state imposes a progressive tax, the more equality it can achieve;
however, the efficiency losses become larger.
It seems a fair presumption that more equal expenditures would bring equal
education opportunity closer to realization than it is now . . .: inducing some
districts to spend more and some less necessarily entails social costs that rise
with the dimensions of the inducements.
(McCarty, pp. 253-254)
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IV. DEPARTURES AND ANALYSIS -
EXPANSION OF THE SYSTEM?
With collective add-ons, as proposed by Choice, communities may buy more
education by paying an additional price or tax. This could be exemplified by a family
who would want to buy more and expensive private day care for their preschool child.
The parents with a higher budget could make up for the welfare losses imposed by an
equalization plan and continue to provide what is best for their child. The parents
with a constrained budget would be receiving what everyone else receives.
Obviously, this proposal does not resolve the inequalities of educational op-
portunity, if the ability to vote collective add-ons are part of the package.
This analysis can be taken further, assuming there are parents who also want to
provide what is best for their child. Eventually, it can be assumed they will want
to have the education similar to the communities able to vote for a collective add-
on. If this represented a large enough population, what was once equal to all will
later tend to be viewed as an unequal amount. They will seek a new equilibrium by
increasing their opportunity costs (e.g., move to another district, travel further),
by seeking a change in income distribution (an increased voucher amount or tax
reform) or regulation (the state's interests must expand to provide the same to all).
Hence, the system levels up to a new point of equilibrium. Again, the system is at
the point of inefficiency, though there will be greater equality.
It could also be assumed that this condition will not be maintained because
societal interests will take over. Because society benefits from the development of
an education elite and the expansion of skills, again the educational sector will be
forced to provide more education for some.
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Using the principles of best and equal, the system expands in a sense. When
the state satisfies its interests of the same to all, parents will expand that amount
based on what is the best for their own children. The expansion of the system
is supported by the requirements of society to provide more to some in order to
ensure its goodness.
If this analysis is in fact valid, then one could say that there is a natural tension
and balance between equality of educational opportunity and access to education
(equity) and efficiency. The educational sector seems to expand and contract be-
tween those two requirements, depending upon the desires of the polity, the interests
of the state, parents and society. What is striking is that perhaps this is a natural
movement. We will never have one over the other - equality over efficiency or vice
versa - in this democratic society, and maybe we should not concern ourselves solely,
then, on this issue.
A. CAN THE SYSTEM EXPAND UPWARD?
If the system is set in motion, it is expected that there would be a uniform
growth rate. However, decreasing marginal utility to society would eventually
be expected to take over the system. (Green, p. 91) In other words, the growth
of the educational system is dependent on the relationship between attainment and
the distribution of courage, choice and ability and/or the desired distribution
of socio-economic outcomes. The system will grow only if there is a corresponding
growth in the requirements of society for increased attainment.
If attainment is measured by receipt of a second-order benefit, such as a certifi-
cate or diploma, and each successive generation were able to obtain more and higher
second order goods, then the social value of the benefits would increase. Eventually,
however, this value would decline. Consider the value of a high school education.
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If relatively few people had this diploma (as was the case prior to the 1900s), it is
unlikely it would be a prerequisite for job entry for the majority of jobs available. As
the amount of people who have this diploma increases, so does the utility of having
the certificate. Employers will use them as screening devices to qualify applicants
for jobs. People who have the diploma probably possess certain desirable attitudes
and values and have attained a certain measurable amount of knowledge, skill or
learning ability. If everyone has one, the social value will decline and approach
zero. The degree can no longer be used as a screening device; the attributes desired
by an employer can no longer be discerned by using the high school diploma as a
measure. Therefore, the diploma becomes meaningless as a measure for job entry,
and new screening devices, higher attainment levels, or more specifically described
skills, must be found.
Recent studies have addressed the question of whether the U.S. educational
system is producing more college graduates than are socially useful.
As long as education is seen as a means of achieving social mobility, the interest
and the incentive to obtain more education will continue. As long as those with
more schooling fare better in the labor market than those with less schooling,
overeducation will continue to exist.
(Rumberger, pp. 4, 127)
Although Rumberger's study is mostly directed at the effects of higher education on
the labor market, the fact that attainment at this level is preceded by attainments
at the primary and secondary level is obvious.
The measures used by the National Center for Education Statistics to deter-
mine the efficacy of the education sector are high school attainment and conferment
of higher degrees. The numbers of high school graduates have increased from 16.8%
(of the population of all 17-year olds) in 1919 to over 73% in 1987. In 1982, the
number of first degrees (bachelor degrees) awarded per million of population was
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4100, the highest when compared to Japan, West Germany, the UK, and Australia.
However, the average annual rate of growth in real Gross Domestic Product (a mea-
sure of output/productivity per person employed) was the lowest at 1.2 percent per
year. (Maglen, p. 285; NCES, p. 108)
What happens when you consider the 995,900 of the population that did not
receive a bachelor degree? Is it this sector that drives down productivity? Maybe
the number indicates it doesn't help to make more college graduates. Maybe it
means we need to direct our attention not to attainment levels, but to other factors
and outcomes.
These become larger questions that need to be asked of those who seem to
attribute our economic decline and loss of global competitiveness to a malaise in the
education sector.
The bottom line is - the principles of best and equal will continue to expand
the system to a point where the marginal utility of receiving extra amounts of
education finally diminishes. One might wonder if, prior to achieving that point,
society should somehow limit the number of entrants into the system, vice risking
expansion and the accompanying diminishing marginal returns?
B. SUMMARY
Many say that increased dollars do little to improve a child's chances for
success.
Putting more money into poor districts . . . won't change anything . . . Money
is not the answer ... It has to begin in the home. The Wall Street Journal
applauds the thousands . . . who have jammed the streets ... in protest of the
[equalization] plan. Phone calls aired on several radio stations voice a raw
contempt for the capacities of urban children . . . but predict the imminent
demise of education in the richer districts if their funding is cut back. Money,
the message seems to indicate, is absolutely crucial to rich districts
but will be of little difference to the poor.
(Kozol, p. 44)
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Choice is not the quantum leap for school reform as some had hoped, especially
in the area of school finance reform. In all actuality, with the collective add-on, the
disparities between rich and poor are legitimized under a liberal cloud of democratic
choice.
The good side, however, and the point many make is, with Choice, we may
not be just throwing more money at the system. With Choice the dollars
schools receive are backed by a commitment from the parents and the
community.
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V. WHERE ARE WE NOW? - SOME FINAL
THOUGHTS
One has to ask - Where is our educational sector in this shifting paradigm
and what are the policy implications?
In order to answer this question, one must look to the polity inputs and social
outcomes the polity expects to perpetuate through the educational process. First,
one needs to look at the changing demographics within the society. What manner
of students does the process need to serve, from what socio-economic backgrounds?
Second, one needs to describe the measures of attainment and achievement desired
and the distribution of educational and second- order benefits that will be meaning-
ful to the desired social outcomes.
In answer to the first question, American society is extremely diverse and
changing. From 1976 to 1986, the proportion of White enrollments in public schools
decreased by 13%, whereas the proportion of Hispanic and Asian enrollments in-
creased 44% and 116%, respectively. Although Black and Native American en-
rollments have remained fairly constant, the poverty level among these groups has
grown as well as the poverty level for all groups - including white - whether in
rural or urban environments. The number of special education students, including
mentally retarded and learning disabled, rose from 8% in 1977 to 11% in 1988. In
1987, among the teachers' perceptions of the major causes of student difficulties
were 1) children left on their own after school; 2) poverty in the student's home; 3)
single-parent families; and 4) families in which both parents work full time. These
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statistics are taken in order for the educational sector to assess what the chang-
ing needs of the polity are and how it will respond to the challenges of the future.
(NCES, pp. 55-56, 67)
What about the second question? What are the outcomes we desire? One
answer would be the requirements of business and industry for labor. What kinds
of skills are needed? What kinds of values can the system inculcate to ensure labor
has a positive work ethic?
There are problems in attaching the outcomes of education to the needs of cor-
porate America. First, it is not necessarily true that education contributes directly
to the productivity of a firm or can be correlated directly to growth in GNP, as
stated previously. Other factors, such as motivation and job satisfaction, as well as
how the industry manages its other resources, impact productivity as well. Second,
"the motivations of corporations are complex." The purpose of schools, if they were
in the hands of the corporations, would be to meet the challenge of competition
from the Japanese. (Deyoung, 1990; Maglen, 1990)
Most labor force analysts will agree that the trend will be for more service-
oriented workers who have technological skills and who are flexible, adaptable, and
mobile. People should expect to, and be able to, move from job to job, apply
existing and new technology, and be able to "think on their feet". (Henderson and
Mowery, 1988; Van Horn, 1990) Standardized testing does not provide an assessment
for these abilities. In fact, the current move to emphasize skill attainment (math,
reading, science) only tests a student's ability to restate rotely learned facts and
apply procedures to problem solving in a limited context. This has nothing to do
with the requirements of flexibility or adaptability in a changing world economy.
More importantly, however, while standardized exams may allow for interna-
tional comparisons and certification, which indicate skill level for job entry, this
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limited approach does not provide information on whether children "are prepared
for the responsibilities of democratic citizenship" (Wray, p. 771). Considering that
"George Bush was elected by 27 percent of the eligible electorate" and the "U.S. is
now . . . last among democracies of the world in proportion of eligible voters who
take part in national elections," this concern is of primary importance. Consider,
too, that those who are not voting are largely the lower levels of our "social pyramid
- the poor, minorities, and younger people" (Dolbeare, p. 144).
Let me frame the question in a different fashion: what are the interests of the
other stakeholders - the state, parents and society? The state has both economic
and civil interests. The state is interested in providing education because it is
cheaper than having children end up on welfare or in prison. Parents neither want
their children in prison or on welfare, nor do they want less than anyone else is
getting. In fact - if they are truly rational - they will want more if they can get
it. Society wants the same things as the state, but also wants to provide additional
benefits for those who will carry on the tasks of ensuring we have a good society.
The answer to this question, posed this way, then, is that the outcomes we want
will be diverse, and we want them to be diverse to ensure a good society;
but we want the outcomes to be the same regarding the inculcation of a degree
of economic independence and participation in the processes of democracy.
A. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
First, and most importantly, we need to ask whether we are underinvesting in
our children. There is sufficient evidence to indicate that this is the case. Whereas
Americans tend to invest more in higher education, Europeans tend to support
preschoolers to a greater degree (Fuchs, p. 17). A consideration in this approach
is that public subsidies of higher education might tend to further the divergence
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between lower and higher income families, given that more economically advantaged
families will be sending their children to college. The support of preschoolers could
be viewed as more equal, especially if this investment were to be made in the form
of Head Start or Chapter I entitlements.
Head Start currently serves only one in every five eligible children. Although
one of Bush's budget proposals increased Head Start funding by $100 million, full
funding for all eligible three- and four-year-olds, and 30% of eligible five-year-olds,
is expected to amount to $7.6 billion by 1994. (Thompson, p. 132, Agenda, p. 10)
The system of education appears to be larger than the sector traditionally
described. Children are highly dependent on the income of their parents. Simi-
larly, their attainments and achievements are closely linked to the socio-economic
backgrounds and education level of their parents (Brempong, 1991; Fuchs, 1991;
Mayeske, 1972). Education is a part of our social welfare and therefore, should
include the health and welfare of families, of children before they are born. The
incidence of children born to poverty is increasing and this condition is worsened
when compounded by the fact that more children are being born to parents who
abuse drugs and alcohol. The increased incidences of child abuse, child murders
(by other children), and child suicide all indicate that there is something seriously
wrong in the communities of children. In order to take care of the children, it is
imperative that someone take care of their environments.
Our most recent priorities as a nation can be shown in looking at appropria-
tions of the federal budget for 1989. Domestic Functions (totalling $144.1 billion)
received approximately 31% of the total appropriations ($462.3 billion). Of that
31%, education, training, employment and social services received 18%, or 5.6% of
the total amount appropriated. If Health is added ($14.3 billion), the appropriations
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we could call investments from the federal government in the health and welfare of
children and families is 8.7% of the total 1989 appropriations. (Schick, p. 108)
This dim view of effective appropriations for the welfare of children is exac-
erbated when you consider that the economic well-being of children decreases with
the number of children in a household.
The problem of underinvestment in disadvantaged children has probably grown
worse in the past decade, largely because of the widening inequality of income
and reluctance of households without children to make transfers (via the tax
system) to households with children.
(Fuchs, p. 20)
Not only are we not investing enough in children in a monetary sense, our children
are also deprived of time with parents, grandparents and other adult role models.
Single- headed households, dual-income parents and mobility of the aged are the
main causes of these growing social problems.
B. WHAT CAN BE DONE
The primary research questions was - What are the efficiency and equity effects
of Choice as proposed in Politics, Markets, and America's Schools . The issue of
Choice has drawn heated debates, and that is good. It is only through conflict that
we can see the issues clearly and then hope to resolve them. No one can approach
the issue of education without it becoming a personal issue. It is an emotional issue
because at the heart of it lies our very values, our fondness for what was, and a
vision of how it could be better for our children.
Under a system of Choice, as proposed by Chubb and Moe, it is doubtful that
the disparities between rich and poor will significantly be reduced, or that equity
gains will be measurable and defensible. To gain a closer realization of equity,
perhaps a form of progressive tax will have to be adopted.
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After we have looked at any reform issue, we are left with a final question
that only political and social consensus can answer. What do we really want of
our schools, and what should education be about? I propose that, to begin with,
education should be about citizenship, contributing to society and enhancing our
ability to confront and adapt to future challenges.
When we seek to answer those questions more fully, we must remember that
our children are a public good in and of themselves. The future of the next generation
is at stake in them. How we shape the world for them today will define how it will
look in their future. As Alfred North Whitehead wrote in 1929:
When one considers in its length and in its breadth the importance of this
question of the education of the nation's young, the broken lives, the defeated
hopes, the national failures, which result from the frivolous inertia with which
it is treated, it is difficult to restrain oneself from savage rage. In the conditions
of modern life the rule is absolute, the race which does not value trained
intelligence is doomed. Not all your heroism, not all your social charm, not all
your wit, not all your victories on land or at sea, can move back the finger of
fate. To-day we maintain ourselves.
To-morrow science will be moved from the judgement which will then be pro-
nounced on the uneducated.
We can be content with no less than the old summary of educational ideal
which has been current at any time from the dawn of our civilisation. The
essence of education is that it be religious.
Pray, what is religious education?
A religious education is an education which inculcates duty and reverence.
Duty arises from our potential control over the course of events. Where at-
tainable knowledge could have changed the issue, ignorance has been the guilt
of vice. And the foundation of reverence is this perception, that the present
holds within itself the complete sum of existence, backwards and forwards,
that whole amplitude of time, which is eternity.
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